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Abstract
This article contributes new evidence about the types of immigrants that British nationals would ac-
cept as fellow citizens. I analyse the preferences of a large, nationally representative UK sample
employing a choice-based conjoint-analysis experiment. Respondents were presented with paired
vignettes of applicant types characterized by a combination of attributes chosen randomly. The attrib-
utes of immigrants with the largest impact on the probability of granting citizenship were occupation
and religion: respondents especially penalized applicants who were Muslim or with no occupation.
Respondents granted citizenship at different rates on average (from 64 per cent to 80 per cent): rates
were lower among respondents who had voted to leave the EU, were older, less educated, and earned
less. The types of immigrant who were most likely to be granted citizenship did not, however, vary by
respondents’ income, education, or age, and varied little between Brexit Leave and Remain voters.
My findings about nationals’ citizen preferences reflect the inclusive–exclusive nature of British citi-
zenship and national identity, whereby inclusion is conditional on productivity and on the endorse-
ment of liberal values.
Introduction
We know much about the type of immigrant that native
populations in western countries prefer (McLaren and
Johnson, 2007; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). In con-
trast, we know very little about the type of immigrant
western citizens are willing to accept as fellow citizen.
Attention to citizenship and attitudes to naturalization is
important because citizenship is a more demanding and
definitive form of inclusion than entry into the country.
Citizenship provides immigrants with crucial rights on a
par with those held by native citizens and it marks na-
tional identity and belonging (Bloemraad, Korteweg,
and Yurdakul, 2008). However, citizenship differs from
popular conceptions of nationhood. The allocation of
citizenship demands thinking not only about what
makes someone a co-national but also about whom to
recognize as equally entitled to a claim on mutual soli-
darity and responsibility.
We know that broader attitudes towards immi-
grants form along multiple domains in complex ways
(Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2020). These domains, such
as ethno-cultural similarity, cannot be reduced to single
individual characteristics, such as country of origin. If
people do not have enough information on all relevant
individual characteristics, they form preferences by
using stereotypes that bundle these characteristics
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together. That is, they form preferences on the grounds
of the characteristics they assume (Adida, Laitin, and
Valfort, 2010). In addition, groups of respondents may
respond differently to these individual characteristics,
according to their own socio-demographic profile.
Such considerations are also relevant to how popula-
tions come to conclusions about entitlement to natural-
ization. However, extant evidence on preferences for
citizenship allocation is not able to disentangle the ef-
fect of multiple factors affecting preferences and to do
so for different groups of respondents (Kobayashi
et al., 2015; Creighton and Jamal, 2015; Hainmueller
and Hangartner, 2013; Harell et al., 2012).
Employing an innovative experimental design, this
article provides unique insights into what British citizens
regard as legitimate criteria for extending citizenship to
immigrants. I address the limitations of existing research
by employing a conjoint experiment design in which citi-
zen preferences were elicited by presenting respondents
with vignettes that describe potential applicants for UK
citizenship. With this design I am able to simultaneously
test and compare the causal effects of each of several ap-
plicant characteristics on the probability of granting citi-
zenship, therefore, reflecting the multi-dimensionality of
the decision-making process. I am also able to separate
out the different elements of clusters of characteristics
that typically combine in existing stereotypes. For ex-
ample, stereotypes associated with country of origin
may drive hostility towards immigrants partly because
of other characteristics that those from that origin are
assumed to possess, e.g. their occupation. In addition, I
investigate how respondents’ expressed preferences re-
late to their own characteristics in ways that may be
inferred from the literature as relating to broader atti-
tudes to nationhood and economic threat (e.g. their
Brexit voting behaviour).
My research also contributes new empirical know-
ledge about the normative contours of citizenship in the
United Kingdom, complementing existing literature that
has been theoretical in orientation (e.g. Joppke 2003;
Sales 2010). The United Kingdom provides a particular-
ly interesting case for investigating the boundaries of
citizenship that are set by the public. Although
Britishness is not framed around belonging to one
ethno-cultural group, governments have carved out a
British identity that is increasingly more exclusive (Sales,
2010). British nationals’ preferences over who should
become a fellow citizen are likely to reflect the socio-
historical characterization of British national identity
and citizenship policy.
Whom the British public are willing to accept as fellow
citizen has important implications. It has implications for
the successful integration of those who are excluded from
being recognized as fellow citizens; it has implications for
our understanding of what it means to be a British citizen;
and it has implications for the degree of social cohesion in
the country.
In the next section, I review the literature on citizen-
ship and broader attitudes towards immigrants that I
use to form expectations for nationals’ preferences
regarding who gets to be a citizen. I also outline key
turning points in the recent evolution of citizenship pol-
icy in the United Kingdom that may shape who is
regarded as eligible for inclusion. In the third section, I
describe my data, experimental design, and analytical
methods. I then present the findings, which I discuss in
the final section of the article.
Background
For natives to accept an immigrant as fellow citizen they
must first be in favour of the immigrant’s presence in the
country. Yet, citizenship is more demanding and per-
manent. It is a legal status that grants equality in rights,
duties, and political agency; it is also national identity, a
salient social identity to most. It follows that on the one
hand, selection of the preferred citizen-type could be
expected to follow similar criteria to the selection of the
preferred immigrant-type. On the other hand, preferen-
ces for citizenship may follow different patterns and be
more stringent. To date, to whom people are willing to
grant citizenship remains an unanswered question.
Citizenship as Entitlement to Equal Claims
Citizenship provides key rights, which nationals may be
reluctant to grant immigrants. This may be especially
the case for non-European immigrants who have more
to gain from citizenship acquisition. In addition to the
right to vote in general elections and the protection
abroad associated with being a British passport-holder,
non-EU immigrants need to naturalize to enjoy the right
of free movement, to vote in local elections, to transfer
social security benefits across countries, and to access
public sector jobs. However, citizens of all 53
Commonwealth states, as well as Irish, Cypriot, and
Maltese citizens, have the right to vote in the UK nation-
al elections if they are UK residents.
Besides tangible rights, citizenship implies a degree of
permanence and irreversibility to all immigrants. For ex-
ample, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, it is
likely that people saw the granting of citizenship as a
ticket to a right to stay in the country for Europeans as
much as for non-Europeans.
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Citizenship also promotes equality for all its members,
who are equally entitled to make claims and demands
from the state and other citizens (Bloemraad, 2018).
Native citizens may therefore associate citizenship with a
claim on welfare support equivalent to their own and to
penalize applicants whose characteristics signal low-eco-
nomic value and productivity. It follows that because citi-
zenship implies the granting of rights and sharing of
resources, native citizens are likely to extend citizenship to
immigrants according to their assumptions about contribu-
tions offered by different types of immigrant.
The literature on attitudes towards immigrants sug-
gests that negative attitudes are directed to specific sub-
groups who elicit the perception of economic threat.
These usually include the low-skilled, immigrants from
low-income countries and refugees (Citrin et al., 2006;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Ford, 2011). Both
Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Economic Labour
Competition Theory credit these attitudes to competi-
tion over resources (Sherif et al., 1961; Kunovich,
2013). Immigrants represent a threat when the native
population either objectively experiences or perceives
competition with immigrants over jobs and services, and
perceives them to be a threat to the economy and to ag-
gravate the tax burden (Polavieja, 2016).
The literature on welfare state support has also
explored the role of perceptions of deservingness as
opposed to threat to explain negative attitudes towards
immigrants who do not work (Reeskens and van der
Meer, 2019). People may be less sympathetic towards
immigrants whom they believe do not deserve to be in the
country because they have not earned support, for ex-
ample, by demonstrating effort and willingness to work.
Empirical evidence is consistent with these theories.
Evidence for the United States and Europe, including the
United Kingdom, suggests that the perception of a higher
collective burden, the belief that immigrants steal jobs
from the native-born, are dependent on state support and
make demands on social assistance services negatively af-
fect attitudes towards immigrants (Citrin et al., 2006;
Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox,
2010). Based on this I generate the following hypothesis:
H1a: Respondents are less likely to grant citizenship to
the applicants they perceive as least productive and to be
a burden on the welfare system.
Citizenship as National Identity
Insofar as citizenship is understood as national identity,
it represents an important social identity that arises
from the imagining of the national community as limited
to fellow-members who share certain characteristics
(Anderson, 1991). Social Identity Theory and Social
Categorisation Theory posit that people tend to categor-
ize themselves and others in groups according to salient
social identities, such as national identity (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). This ingroup–out-
group juxtaposition elicits feelings of inclusion with the
ingroup, distinctiveness, and superiority over the out-
group. It follows that people should be more reluctant
to extend citizenship to those who they feel threaten
their conception of national identity by shifting its boun-
daries (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008).
Research on popular conceptions of nationalism in
western countries, including in the United Kingdom,
finds that, irrespective of historical constructions of na-
tional identity, the majority of the population largely
uses ethno-cultural elements in defining national identity
(Tilley, Exley, and Heath, 2004; Janmaat, 2006). The
inclusion of ethno-culturally distant immigrants as equal
members should therefore be threatening to ingroup
identity as it reshapes the definition of Britishness.
The broader literature that investigates attitudes
towards immigrants reinforces this expectation.
Greater hostility is typically directed towards the
immigrants who are identified as ethno-culturally dif-
ferent from the majority. Hostility based on origins
may be due to dislike for specific characteristics, such
as cultural practices (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort,
2010). A sense of threat may arise from fear that im-
migration flows of non-white immigrants will later re-
sult in a non-white majority population. From an
analysis of British Social Attitudes survey data be-
tween 1983 and 1996, Ford (2011) finds that there is
a racial hierarchy, in which white immigrants are
largely preferred to non-white ones. People may also
fear immigrants because they worry that their customs
and values may permeate into the majority culture, or
even take it over, changing it irreversibly. Evidence
for Europe, including for the United Kingdom, sug-
gests that greater hostility is directed towards Muslim
immigrants, who are associated with values and cus-
toms that are considered threatening to the majority
culture and to social safety (Field, 2007; McLaren and
Johnson, 2007; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Hellwig
and Sinno, 2017; Andersen and Mayerl, 2018;
Creighton and Jamal, 2020).
Shared ancestry and length of residence, which are
usually not pertinent to the study of attitudes towards
immigrants, are also likely to be relevant attributes for
the allocation of citizenship. They convey ethno-cultural
similarity and integration (Gellner, 2006). They are also
legal criteria in rights to claim citizenship. On balance, I
therefore hypothesize that:
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H1b: Respondents are less likely to grant citizenship to
immigrants who they perceive as most ethno-culturally
distant.
Preferences for Citizenship Criteria
Existing studies on attitudes towards citizenship appli-
cants identify the effect of some of the applicant attrib-
utes that signal ethno-cultural similarity and economic
contribution. Harell et al. (2012) find for Canada and
the United States that, overall, preferred naturalization
applicants are immigrants with a high-status job, but
ethnicity does not matter greatly. In contrast,
Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) find with a natural
experiment for Switzerland that country of origin was
by far the most important predictor of approvals. Local
residents were less likely to grant citizenship to appli-
cants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia than other
countries. Kobayashi et al. (2015) reach similar conclu-
sions for Japan, where respondents favoured Korean
over Chinese workers in the likelihood of awarding
citizenship.
However, preferences for the allocation of citizen-
ship are likely to be articulated in more complex ways.
Ethno-cultural and financial threat cannot be reduced to
single characteristics, such as origins and income
(Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2020). For each domain, there
may be several individual characteristics that independ-
ently drive overall attitudes. There is substantial evi-
dence that hostility towards immigrants is often due to
stereotypes that bundle characteristics together (Adida,
Laitin, and Valfort, 2010; Sobolewska, Galandini, and
Lessard-Phillips, 2017). It follows that in the absence of
a full set of information about individual characteristics
people tend to make assumptions about the immigrant’s
level of integration, occupation, and religion based on
their previous knowledge or preconceived ideas about
the origin group they belong to (Phelps, 1972; Fiske,
2010). Hostility based on origins may therefore be due
to dislike for other assumed characteristics, such as reli-
gion (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2010). It is only by pre-
senting detailed applicant profiles that we can
disentangle which attribute is at the heart of the decision
to grant citizenship or not. Existing studies on citizen-
ship preferences have not been able to disentangle such
individual characteristics from aggregate stereotypes. I
therefore hypothesize that:
H1c: When respondents have information on individual
characteristics (such as religion or income level) associ-
ated with stereotypes related to specific origins, the
effect of origins reduces in salience for preferences
regarding the granting of citizenship.
Heterogeneity in Attitudes across Groups
Respondents’ preference over certain immigrant charac-
teristics, such as skill-level and country of origin, and
the number of citizenships granted, are likely to vary
according to their socio-economic status, age, and polit-
ical preferences.
In comparison to the most highly educated and to
younger adults, low educated and older people are more
attached to their national British identity (Manning and
Roy 2010; Nandi and Platt 2015). They may therefore
be more invested in who belongs and who does not in
the country, and in the potential changes to the charac-
terization of British identity. Similarly, since the attach-
ment to an English identity appears to have been a key
driver of the vote to leave the European Union in the
Brexit referendum of 2016, Leave voters may be more
reluctant to grant citizenship, and hence national
belonging, to immigrants (Henderson et al., 2017).
The evidence on attitudes towards immigrants sug-
gests there is variation across populations in the ex-
tent to which immigrants are felt to be threatening in
the ways described. Those with more negative atti-
tudes typically include people with low levels of edu-
cation and income. Poorer people are more susceptible
to economic threat because they are more vulnerable
to competition in access to public services and social
assistance compared to richer native residents (Scheve
and Slaughter, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).
However, according to economic competition theo-
ries, anyone may have negative attitudes if in direct
competition with immigrants in the labour market
(Kunovich, 2013).
The threat of ethno-cultural diversity might also
explain why people with lower as opposed to higher
levels of education are more averse to immigration. In
comparison with low-educated people, better edu-
cated individuals have better economic knowledge
and are not only more accepting of ethno-cultural di-
versity but also may even prefer it (Haubert and
Fussell, 2006). However, some have questioned
whether education changes attitudes, whether it mere-
ly teaches what is socially acceptable (Creighton and
Jamal, 2015), or whether those who have more posi-
tive attitudes self-select in education (Lancee and
Sarrasin, 2015).
Considerable evidence also suggests that older cohorts
are more averse to immigration than younger ones
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(Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). This could be due to shifts
in attitudes across cohorts or to people becoming more
anti-immigrant as they become older. Party affiliation is
also an important correlate of negative attitudes towards
immigrants. Left-wing voters are more likely to be sup-
portive of immigration compared to right-wing ones
(Rustenbach, 2010). In the case of the United Kingdom,
Brexit supporters identified immigration as a major driving
concern that motivated their vote to leave the EU (Prosser,
Mellon, and Green, 2016). Immigrants and natives of im-
migrant background have more positive attitudes towards
immigrants than the native majority population, perhaps
because they feel less socially distant from other immi-
grants, although differences dissipate with time spent in
the host country (Braakmann, Waqas, and Wildman,
2017; Becker, 2019). Finally, environmental factors, such
as GDP contraction and the share of foreign-born popula-
tion, also explain variation in attitudes towards immi-
grants across countries and over time (Dancygier and
Donnelly, 2013).
Nonetheless, experimental studies for the United
States and the United Kingdom find evidence of a con-
sensus over attitudes towards immigrants across varying
socio-economic status and demographic profile (Harell
et al., 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015;
Sobolewska, Galandini, and Lessard-Phillips, 2017). As
these studies’ research design is less susceptible to social
desirability bias, their findings question the existence of
heterogeneity in attitudes.
Harell et al. (2012) and Kobayashi et al. (2015)
study heterogeneity in citizenship preferences across
groups of respondents. Harell et al. (2012) find that in
the United States, though not in Canada, high-income
respondents approved a higher number of citizenship
applications on average than low-income ones.
However, they do not find variation in how groups of
respondents react to immigrants’ job status for either
country. In contrast, Kobayashi et al. (2015) find that
affluent Japanese respondents were more likely to re-
ject low-status applicants compared to their high-
income counterparts. On balance, from this literature, I
hypothesize that:
H2a: Respondents of low socio-economic status, who
are older and voted for Brexit are less likely to grant citi-
zenship than their counterparts.
H2b: Differences in naturalisation preferences outlined
in H1a-b are smaller or non-existent for respondents of
high socio-economic status, who are younger and voted
against Brexit compared to their counterparts.
British Citizenship
Finally, an investigation of popular preferences over the
selection of co-nationals requires appropriate under-
standing of the historical-political characterization of
the UK citizenship policy and national identity. Public
opinion does not form in a vacuum, but it typically mir-
rors policy design and political discourse (Mau, 2003).
After the breakdown of the British Empire, the UK
government had to reconcile an inclusive citizenship
that extended to people born in former colonies, with its
intent to ground British identity on lineage and culture,
therefore, making it more exclusive (Joppke, 2003).
Through a series of immigration and nationality acts it
tried to limit entry to Britain to people who had ances-
tral ties to the United Kingdom, that is immigrants of
white skin colour. Nevertheless, by 1965 Britain had al-
ready become a multi-racial society. Despite the hostile
immigration and citizenship policies, the British ap-
proach inherited from the empire was not assimilation-
ist, but multicultural. This meant that already settled
immigrants were quickly accepted as ethnic minorities
(Joppke, 2003). It follows that British national identity
did not take shape around a mono ethno-culture, but ra-
ther as a pluralistic encompassing of different ethno-
cultural groups. Nonetheless, tensions between majority
and minorities remained.
The riots in the United Kingdom in the summer of
2001 and the rise in Islamic extremism that started in
the same year represented a symbolic moment that
pushed the British government to promote a thicker
national identity with the aim of increasing social co-
hesion between ethnic groups (Home Office, 2001).
Both Labour and Conservative governments have
since explicitly promoted democratic, liberal, and tol-
erant values, referenced by the embodiment in institu-
tions, such as the NHS and the BBC. These values
have come to define Britishness in political and public
representations, implicitly in juxtaposition to the
assumed non-liberal values of other cultures (Sales,
2010); and they are required by the Office for
Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills
(Ofsted) to be taught in schools.
The early 2000s was also when New Labour devel-
oped a political discourse that emphasized the condi-
tions attached to social rights based on how much
immigrants contribute, both financially and civically,
and how well they integrate within the majority culture.
The introduction of citizenship studies to the national
school curriculum in 2002 and civic integration require-
ments for naturalization in 2005 heralded this shift from
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passive citizenship, whereby citizens are recipients, to
active citizenship, whereby citizens have to engage and
participate in public life (Anderson, 2011).
Although British national identity has historically
been flexible enough to be inclusive of its minority
groups, it has also always been openly exclusionary on
the basis of race first, and liberal values and productivity
later. While it has not been formally tested, this contra-
dictory inclusive–exclusive nature of British national
identity is likely to influence and/or reflect people’s pref-
erence formation and opinions over who belongs and
who does not.
Data and Measures
I employ a choice-based conjoint analysis design based
on that of Hainmueller et al. (2014). I commissioned the
British public opinion and data company YouGov to
field my experiment through its UK Omnibus Survey, a
high-quality multipurpose online panel. In addition to
the experimental responses, the data include informa-
tion about characteristics of respondents.
YouGov recruits respondents via strategic advertis-
ing and partnerships. It then selects a sub-sample based
on how representative it is of socio-demographic charac-
teristics of the British population. YouGov also provides
design weights based on the Census and other surveys to
ensure representativeness. The experiment was fielded at
the end of October 2018 to a sample of 1648 adult
(18þ) respondents. For the analysis, I restricted the sam-
ple to British citizens, giving a total sample of 1,597
respondents. Because I do not have information on
country of birth, it is possible that some of these
respondents are naturalized immigrants. Such respond-
ents may have preferences that differ significantly from
the majority population. However, given that natural-
ized citizens in the United Kingdom account for 6 per
cent of the total population, this group of respondents is
likely to be negligibly small (Fernández-Reino and
Sumption, 2020).
Each respondent was shown five pairwise compari-
sons and was asked to choose whether to grant citizen-
ship or not to each profile. Following Hainmueller,
Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) profiles were shown
in pairs to aid decision-making by giving a direct com-
parison. Each profile vignette was characterized by eight
attributes each with several possible levels. The software
used by YouGov to create the survey experiment
randomized the combination of attribute levels.
Below is an example of an individual profile vignette,
where words in brackets are levels of attributes that
were randomized for each profile vignette:
This [woman] has lived in the UK for [4 years] [and has
a British parent]. [She] is originally from [Somalia].
[She] [is a practising Christian]. [She] has a [good] com-
mand of spoken English and [works as a language
teacher].
Because respondents could not be aware of the aggre-
gate effects of their responses, they were invited to as-
sume that a limited number of naturalizations can be
granted every year. Each respondent was presented with
the following introduction:
‘The next few pages will show you 5 pairs of profiles of
working age (18-65) people who were not born in the
UK and could submit applications to naturalise as
British citizens.
On the assumption that there is a limited number of nat-
uralisations that can be granted every year, please
choose to whom you want to grant citizenship. You may
choose ONE, BOTH or NEITHER in each pair’.
The resulting dataset contains 1,597 (individuals) 
5 (choice tasks)  2 (profile vignettes) ¼ 15,970
observations nested in 1,597 respondents. YouGov over-
samples and then stops collecting data once it receives
enough complete responses from the target representa-
tive population. Hence, there are no missing data.
Measures
Vignette Attributes
Following H1a, the vignettes I use include information
about attributes that signal productivity and dependency
on the welfare state:
Occupation: I choose a list of occupations to reflect dif-
ferent income levels and status. I distinguish between cor-
porate manager, language teacher, IT professional, farmer,
and cleaner. I make a further distinction between jobs that
people perceive as beneficial and valuable to society, such
as doctors, and those more likely to need benefit support,
such as being unemployed or a stay-at-home parent. A
breakdown of the most common occupations immigrants
in the United Kingdom are employed in is shown in
Supplementary Appendix Table SA1.
English proficiency: I distinguish between a basic,
good, and excellent command of spoken English.
Refugee status: I differentiate between refugees and
non-refugees when relevant as per country of origin.
Refugees experience a different more accessible path to
citizenship.
Following H1b, the vignettes I use include informa-
tion about attributes that signal the degree of ethno-
cultural similarity:
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British ancestry: I differentiate between whether the
applicant has a British parent, grandparent, or neither.
Length of residence: I use four levels of length of resi-
dence: 4, 6, 10, and 20 years. Everyone without British
parenthood applying to naturalize must have lived in the
United Kingdom for at least 5 years.
Religion: I differentiate between Muslim, Christian,
and no religion.
Country of origin: Because associated characteristics
are specified in the experiment, the effect of country of
origin may be related to other characteristics, such as
skin colour, culture, and values beyond religion, and
country-level indicators of development, such as average
educational level in the country. I select a pool of high-
income (Germany, Poland, Italy, Ireland, and Australia),
middle-income (India, Pakistan, Syria, and Nigeria), and
low-income (Somalia) countries. These countries also
vary according to majority-white and non-white popula-
tions. British citizens may favour Ireland and Australia
in particular because of their cultural similarity to the
United Kingdom and India because of its close historical
ties to the United Kingdom. Among European countries,
there are further effects to be drawn out. Since the
Brexit referendum centred around the fear of immigra-
tion and loss of sovereignty, I distinguish between
Poland (as the main EU immigration source country),
Germany (as particularly influential in the EU), and
Italy (as a less contentious European state) (Prosser,
Mellon, and Green, 2016). These are also well repre-
sented nationalities in the United Kingdom (see
Supplementary Appendix Table SA2).
English proficiency as measured above.
Finally, I differentiate between men and women in
order to help respondents visualize the profiles. Table 1
presents the full list of attributes, their levels, and
frequencies.
Respondent Characteristics
To address H2a and H2b, I investigate whether there is
heterogeneity in preferences according to the following
respondent characteristics:
Age group: I recoded age into three categories, up to
age 29, between ages of 30 and 49, and over 50 years of
age.
Brexit vote: Respondents are asked whether they
voted to leave the EU or not. Those who did not vote or
could not remember if they had, were counted as
missing.
Income group: I recoded reported values of gross
household income per year into a three-category
variable that corresponds to the poorest third, middle
third, and richest third of the income distribution.
Educational level: Respondents are asked their high-
est level of education attained. I recoded this into three
categories: no qualifications/up to age-16 qualification,
up to age-18 qualifications, higher education
qualification.
The breakdown of key characteristics of sample
respondents, how they are measured and sample fre-
quencies is shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Immigrant characteristics produced by
randomization
Attribute Level N Percentage
Gender Male 8,047 50.4
Female 7,923 49.6
Length of residence 4 years 3,973 24.9
6 years 3,993 25.0
10 years 4,010 25.1
20 years 3,994 25.0










Occupation Corporate manager 1,758 11.0
Doctor 1,804 11.3
IT professional 1,803 11.3
Language teacher 1,724 10.8




Stay at home parent 1,773 11.1
Ancestry British parent 5,368 33.6
British grandparent 5,273 33.0
Neither 5,329 33.4
Refugee status Not refugee 3,256 20.4
Refugee 3,179 19.9
NA 9,535 59.7
English proficiency Basic 4,276 26.8
Good 4,270 26.7
Excellent 7,424 46.5
Religion Christian 5,577 34.9
Muslim 4,788 30.0
No religion 5,605 35.1
Total observations - 15,970 100
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Methods
Conjoint designs have several advantages. First, they
allow to estimate the effect of several attributes on the
same outcome and therefore compare their effect on the
same scale relative to each other (Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014). This allows me to re-
flect the multidimensionality of the decision-making
process.
Secondly, in a choice-based conjoint analysis design,
the combination of attribute levels is randomized, allow-
ing for all possible combinations. The randomization
allows for causal inference. Rather than estimating the
causal effect of each profile as a whole on the probabil-
ity of granting citizenship, I estimate the effect of each
attribute relative to other attributes, the average margin-
al component effect (AMCE), averaged over the joint
distribution of all other attributes. External validity is
an important concern. Profiles had to be credible. For
this reason, I imposed some restrictions on the random-
ization of attributes in the vignettes. I restrict the attrib-
utes ‘country of origin’, ‘language proficiency’, ‘refugee
status’, and ‘religion’ to appear only in certain combina-
tions (see Table 3).
Thirdly, by avoiding direct questioning and increas-
ing anonymity, this experimental design is likely to be
less sensitive to social desirability bias than direct survey
questioning. People do not give their true responses in
surveys because they recognize that discrimination is not
socially desirable (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). If
social desirability bias is higher for subgroups of
respondents, such as the more highly educated, it leads
to misleading comparisons (An, 2015). Moreover, peo-
ple may feel the need to mask their hostile attitudes to-
wards some groups of immigrants (e.g. Christians) and
not others (e.g. Muslims) in response to the stigmatiza-
tion and normalization of attitudes towards them, there-
fore also leading to misleading comparisons (Creighton
and Jamal, 2015, 2020).
Analytical Strategy
First, I calculate the proportion of applications that are
granted citizenship (‘average acceptance rate’).
Second, to estimate the AMCEs, I employ a linear
probability model, where the choice to approve or reject
the profile is the outcome variable and the attributes are
independent categorical variables. Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) prove that the linear
probability estimator is an unbiased estimator of the
AMCE. The regression coefficient associated with each
attribute level is an estimate of the AMCE, i.e. the effect
of moving from the reference category to that level. An
Table 2. Weighted respondent characteristics
Characteristics Level N Percentage
Brexit vote Leave 723 45
Remain 655 41
Did not vote/cannot remember 219 11
Age group Under 29 years 285 18
30–49 years 514 32
Over 50 years 798 50
Gross household income Poorest third 608 38
Middle third 442 28
Richest third 546 34
Education No formal qualification/Age-16 498 31
Age-18 488 31
Higher qualification or equivalent 553 34
Do not know/prefer not to say 58 4
Ethnicity White 1,471 92
Non-white 120 8
Prefer not to say 6 0
Gender Male 777 48.5
Female 822 51.5
Total 1,597 100
Notes: Age-16 level of education includes GCSE certificate or equivalent; Age-18 level of education includes A levels or equivalent; higher qualification level of educa-
tion includes teaching diploma.
Frequencies are weighted.
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example would be the effect of the applicant being a
‘woman’ as opposed to a ‘man’, on the probability of
the granting of citizenship, averaged over the joint distri-
bution of all other attributes. The linear regression esti-
mator is an unbiased estimator for conjoint experiments
that typically include a high number of attributes with
multiple levels, even if particular combinations might
not necessarily appear throughout the experiment.
To account for the randomization restrictions, I ex-
tend Hainmueller et al.’s (2014) design to allow for a
four-way restriction of combinations of attributes. It fol-
lows that estimation of the AMCEs need to take into ac-
count only the plausible counterfactuals that appeared
in the experiment and therefore to exclude the restricted
ones (e.g. being a refugee born in Germany). To do this,
I include a four-way interaction term. To estimate the
AMCEs of these attributes, I compute the linear combin-
ation of the appropriate coefficients in the interaction,
weighted according to the probability of occurrence. For
instance, because I do not allow the combination of
‘Poland’ as country of origin and ‘Muslim’ as religion,
the counterfactual of the ‘Poland’ AMCE includes all
possible combinations of levels of attributes, with the
exception of ‘Muslim’. To reflect this, ‘Muslim’ receives
a weight of 0 in the AMCE calculation, whereas ‘no reli-
gion’ and ‘Christian’ receive a weight of 1=2.
To demonstrate that the preference patterns identi-
fied are not sensitive to the arbitrary choice of a refer-
ence category, I additionally compute the marginal
mean (MM), the marginal level of support, for each at-
tribute level (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley, 2019). To com-
pare MMs, I partition the sample in order to drop
observations that included restricted attribute levels. For
example, because ‘Muslim’ was not allowed in combin-
ation with ‘Poland’, to compare the MM of ‘Christian’
and ‘Muslim’ I drop the profiles that included ‘Poland’
as country of origin. However, this is not possible for
attributes where the restrictions are mutually exclusive
for substantive reasons. For instance, we cannot com-
pare the MM of ‘refugee’ and ‘non refugee’ across non-
refugee sending countries. See Supplementary Appendix
Table SA3 for subsample sizes, following partitioning.
Third, to investigate whether the effect of religion
varies by country group, I compute and compare the
MMs of religion levels across different country groups
by interacting attributes in the OLS regression (Leeper,
Hobolt, and Tilley, 2019).
Fourth and fifth, I investigate whether average ac-
ceptance rate and attribute level MMs differ across
respondents, e.g. by level of qualification attained. I
compute the average acceptance rate separately for dif-
ferent groups of respondents. I calculate attribute level
MMs by interacting them with respondent characteris-
tics in the OLS regression. I also test the joint signifi-
cance of the interactions using an F-test.
In the regression analysis, I use the design weights
provided with the dataset to adjust the sample to be rep-
resentative of the population as a whole and I cluster
standard errors by respondent to account for the poten-




Respondents granted citizenship to 73 per cent of the
15,970 profiles. This estimate reveals a certain degree of
inclusiveness, especially in comparison to current re-
search on attitudes towards immigrants, which reports
that 77 per cent of the British population would like to
see immigration reduced (Blinder and Richards, 2018).
Table 3. Restrictions imposed on attribute randomization
Attribute Excluded combinations
Country of origin Germany Refugee/not refugee
Poland Muslim; refugee/not refugee
Italy Refugee/not refugee
India Refugee/not refugee
Ireland Basic/good English; refugee/not refugee
Australia Basic/good English; refugee/not refugee
Refugee status Not Refugee Germany/Poland/Italy/Ireland/Australia/India
Refugee Germany/Poland/Italy/Ireland/Australia/India
English proficiency Basic Ireland/Australia
Good Ireland/Australia
Religion Muslim Polanda
aMuslims in Poland are estimated to be only around 0.1% of the total population (Pew Research Center, 2011).
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The high approval rate could indicate an ease with
which people decide to extend their national member-
ship due to their low degree of attachment to citizenship
status and to the low salience national identity has in
their overall sense of identity. Although consistent with
my finding, this explanation is in opposition to my
assumptions about the salience of citizenship, it ignores
the wider political context already discussed and risks
being simplistic. I, therefore, posit that the nature of the
experimental design better explains this finding.
Although respondents were invited to think of citi-
zenship allocation as a limited good, they were not
aware of the aggregate consequences of their individual
choices. However, the high average share of granted
applications indicates that respondents were comfort-
able awarding naturalization. In an extreme case where
a respondent was against naturalization, they would
award no citizenships, regardless of the applicant’s char-
acteristics. In answering the typical survey questions
about whether immigration should be reduced, I posit
that people might be thinking about specific immigrant
profiles or mental stereotypes. We know that respond-
ents tend to be ill-informed about the composition of the
immigrant population (Canoy et al., 2006), and over-
weight the types of immigrants they dislike (such as refu-
gees) compared to those they welcome (such as
students). In contrast, by giving detailed information
about individual applicants, the experiment allowed
respondents to tailor their answer according to the spe-
cifics of the profiles they like and dislike. Respondents
were therefore able to be inclusive, but highly selective
in the types of immigrants they could prefer (and reject).
Most Preferred Profiles
The 27 per cent of profiles that were not granted citizen-
ship differ significantly from those who were: see Figure
1 below. See Supplementary Appendix Figure SA1 for
the corresponding MMs.
I find support for H1a, that respondents were less
likely to grant citizenship to the applicants they per-
ceived as least productive and to be a burden on the wel-
fare system. The attribute that most clearly affects the
probability of being granted citizenship is occupation.
Not only is having a job almost essential for approval
but the type of occupation is also decisive for immi-
grants’ chances of being considered worthy of citizen-
ship. Figure 1 shows a clear gradient whereby lower end
jobs and positions of no occupation are severely penal-
ized compared to better paid and more highly valued
jobs. Interestingly, corporate managers, IT professio-
nals, and language teachers are equally likely to be
awarded citizenship. In contrast, doctors’ applications
have a 5 per cent of points higher chance of being
accepted compared to corporate managers (P < 0.05),
indicating that the social contribution associated with
the occupation is more important than pay. As we move
down the pay scale, we observe a monotonic decrease in
the probability of being accepted for citizenship.
Compared to corporate managers, administrative
workers, farmers, and cleaners are 5 per cent, 7 per cent,
and 9 per cent of points, respectively less likely to be
considered to merit citizenship (P < 0.05). At the bot-
tom of the scale, the effect of not having an occupation
is striking. Stay-at-home parents and unemployed immi-
grants are associated with a penalty of 17 per cent and
36 per cent of points, respectively compared to corpor-
ate managers (P < 0.05). This finding indicates a strong
aversion to economic inactivity. It may also indicate that
respondents associated the granting of citizenship with
the granting of welfare rights.
People who speak excellent English are 11 per cent
of points more likely to be awarded citizenship com-
pared to those who speak basic English (P < 0.05).
However, there is no significant difference between
those who have a good rather than a basic command of
spoken English. The difficulty in conveying differences
in English language proficiency to a majority sample of
native speakers is probably at the heart of this result.
‘Good’ may have been more difficult to assess relative to
the two other levels of English competence. The result
suggests that respondents rewarded those who signalled
higher employability, ability, and willingness to inte-
grate and be active members of society, as well as com-
pliance and higher similarity with the majority
population.
Refugee status does not affect the probability of
granting British citizenship. Given this contrasts with
general attitudes to refugees, this finding may signal
that, once other attributes are specified, refugees are not
penalized for being perceived as a burden on the welfare
system.
The evidence largely supports H1b, that respondents
were more likely to grant citizenship to the applicants
who were more ethno-culturally close to them. British
ancestry is very relevant to British nationals in their deci-
sion to accept citizenship applications. Applicants with
a British parent or grandparent are 10 per cent and 6 per
cent of points more likely to be granted citizenship than
immigrants with no British lineage (P < 0.05). Although
in the UK grandparents’ nationality has no bearing on
legal entitlement to British citizenship, it appears that
this is a pertinent relationship to the lay public. The ef-
fect of grandparents suggests that people consider being
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Figure 1. Average marginal component effects on the probability of citizenship award
Note: OLS estimates of average effects of each randomized attribute of the probability of being granted British citizenship with clustered standard errors
and weights. Open squares show AMCE point estimates and the horizontal lines delineate 95 per cent confidence intervals. Open squares without hori-
zontal lines show reference categories.
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British as something that is inherited. It also indicates
longstanding ethno-cultural commonality through gen-
erations to represent key grounds for in-group national
belonging.
Length of residence is another clear marker of the
likelihood of granting citizenship. Having lived in the
United Kingdom for 10 and 20 years as opposed to four
years increases the probability of being accepted by 9
per cent of points (P < 0.05) and 12 per cent of points
(P < 0.05), respectively. Interestingly, there is no signifi-
cant difference between 4 and 6 years, although the legal
requirement for most applicants is 5 years. This finding
suggests that respondents might associate length of resi-
dence with attachment to the United Kingdom and, per-
haps, a higher degree of integration.
Respondents severely penalized Muslims. Muslims
are less likely to be granted citizenship by 16 per cent of
points (P < 0.05) compared to Christians. However,
there is no significant difference between Christians and
immigrants with no professed religion.
I examine whether respondents reacted negatively to
the Muslim attribute because they conflated it with non-
whiteness (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2010). If this
were the case, we would expect Muslims to be less likely
to be granted citizenship compared to Christians from
origin countries that are majority white. In such cases,
respondents could plausibly read ‘Muslim’ as signalling
‘non-white’. In contrast, we would not expect a distinc-
tion between Muslims and Christians in non-white ma-
jority countries, where adherents to both religions
would be expected to be non-white. Figure 2 compares
the MMs of Muslim and Christian applicants separately
for majority white countries and majority non-white
countries. Respondents were less likely to grant citizen-
ship to Muslim compared to Christian applicants in
both sets of countries. It follows that respondents
reacted to the Muslim attribute as a religious-cultural
signal as opposed to an indication of non-whiteness.
This finding suggests that the Christian and atheist ma-
jority perceives Muslims as culturally different and with
values that are potentially threatening to British culture
and national identity. Alternatively, respondents may
have felt comfortable disclosing hostility towards
Muslims, but not towards Christians, despite similar lev-
els of support, as evidence for the United States suggests
(Creighton and Jamal, 2015). However, Creighton and
Jamal (2020) find that if before Brexit people did not
feel compelled to mask their attitudes towards Muslims,
they did after the referendum. It follows that if the re-
search design were vulnerable to social desirability bias,
it would be so for Christian and Muslim applicants
alike.
Irish and Australian immigrants are 8 per cent and 7
per cent of points, respectively more likely to be chosen
over Germans (P < 0.05). Of the pool of countries used
in the experiment, these are clearly the most similar ones
to the United Kingdom in terms of culture, and shared
heritage. Although language fluency is a separate attri-
bute, sharing the same mother tongue could also be con-
sidered a relevant cultural factor. However, my
estimates suggest that there are no other patterns of hier-
archical preference with respect to the skin colour of the
country of origin’s majority population, or the income
group it belongs to. For instance, German applicants are
not preferred to Somali ones. Within European countries
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Figure 2. Religion MM by country-group (white vs. non-white)
Note: MMs calculated after OLS regression of the probability of being
granted British citizenship by country-group, with clustered standard
errors and weights. Full and open squares show MMs point estimates for
white and non-white respectively; the horizontal lines delineate 95 per
cent confidence intervals. The average MM is 74 per cent for white coun-
tries and 69 per cent for non-white countries. ‘Poland’ was dropped be-
cause not allowed in combination with ‘Muslim’. White countries
included ‘Italy’, ‘Australia’, ‘Ireland’, and ‘Germany’. The resulting number
of observations for white countries is 4,050. Non-white countries include
‘India’, ‘Pakistan’, ‘Syria’, ‘Nigeria’, and ‘Somalia’. The resulting number
of observations for non-white countries is 5,341.
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to being German or Italian. This is despite the weight
that the debate leading up to the Brexit referendum
gave to Polish immigrants, the largest European immi-
grant group in the United Kingdom (see Supplementary
Appendix Table SA1). Consistent with H1c, this find-
ing suggests that the detailed information given to
respondents is likely to have limited the possibility of
the stereotypes usually associated with country of ori-
gin to influence respondents’ decisions. My analysis
shows that attitudes to ‘groups’ are likely to assume
clusters of characteristics either based on previous
knowledge or stereotypes, but that once separated out,
respondents can distinguish the characteristics they do
or do not object to rather than ‘bundling’ them in a sin-
gle stereotype.
Average Acceptance Rate and Marginal
Means by Respondent Characteristics
In the fourth phase of the analysis, I compute the aver-
age acceptance rate for different groups of respondents,
and the results align with H2a. The groups we would ex-
pect to be most attached to national identity are those
who were more frugal in awarding citizenships. Leave
voters accepted 64 per cent of profiles, whereas Remain
voters accepted 80 per cent. As the level of education
attained gets higher the rate of acceptance does too. It is
64 per cent for respondents with up to age-16 qualifica-
tions, 73 per cent for respondents with up to age-18
qualification, and 77 per cent for respondents with ter-
tiary qualifications. Finally, the share of accepted pro-
files also decreases with age: 78 per cent up to 29-year-
olds, 73 per cent between 30 and 49-year-olds, and 69
per cent over 50-year-olds. This variation indicates that
respondent characteristics are associated with how re-
strictively people view citizenship.
However, the average acceptance rate varies little
with gross household income group. The rate is 70 per
cent for respondents who belong to the lowest third of
gross household income, 74 per cent for the middle ter-
cile group, and 71 per cent for the top tercile group.
This lack of variation may be due to the use of house-
hold, as opposed to individual income.
Perhaps even more interestingly, I do not find evi-
dence in support of H2b, the criteria respondents used
to decide whether the applicant presented to them had a
rightful claim to citizenship are comparable for all types
of respondents. Results are mostly consistent across
gross household income group, education, age group,
gender, and EU referendum vote. See Figure 3 for a
graphical representation of MMs for Brexit Leavers as
opposed to Remainers, and Supplementary Appendix
Figures SA2–SA5 for an illustration of MMs across
other respondent characteristics. Similarly to findings of
experimental studies on attitudes towards immigrants in
other contexts (Harell et al. 2012; Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2015; Sobolewska, Galandini, and Lessard-
Phillips 2017), there appears to be some national con-
sensus over who has greater claims to belonging as a citi-
zen. However, for Remain voters, high-income
respondents, and people who are under the age of 30 the
effect of the applicant’s Muslim as opposed to Christian
religion is negative, but not statistically significant as it
is for Leave voters, low-income respondents, and people
who are above the age of 50 (P < 0.05); these latter
groups also appear to drive the preference for Ireland
and Australia over other countries of origin. These find-
ings are consistent with the expectation that these
groups have a more exclusionary ethno-cultural concep-
tion of Britishness. A higher susceptibility of high in-
come, high education, Remainer, and younger groups to
social desirability bias might explain why they did not
significantly differentiate between Muslim and Christian
applicants. However, Creighton and Jamal (2020) find
that, since Brexit, British people are subject to the same
pressure to mask negative attitudes towards Muslims, ir-
respective of their political attitudes. It follows that if
the experimental design were vulnerable to social desir-
ability bias for some respondents, it would be so for
others too. Moreover, the consensus found with respect
to all other attributes, and the nature of the design
which does not distinguish individual characteristics but
always presents them in combinations, also suggests that
social desirability bias should not be a concern.
See Table SA3 for subsample sizes. To allow compar-
isons between ‘country of origin’ categories all Muslim
and basic/good English cases were dropped when com-
puting MMs for country of origin.
Robustness
I fit alternative specifications to the benchmark model to
account for the possibility that the dependence of profile
choices within individual respondents drives the effect of
applicant characteristics (Hainmueller and Hopkins,
2015). I employ regression model specifications that in-
corporate (i) respondent fixed effects and (ii) random
effects. I also compare MMs of profiles based on whether
they were in first or fifth ordering. To ensure that results
are not driven by the preferences of the children of immi-
grant parents, I estimate the AMCEs for the subsample of
respondents who identify as white British/English/Scottish/
Northern Irish/Welsh. Details for all specifications are in
the Supplementary Appendix.
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Figure 3. MMs by respondent Brexit referendum vote
Note: MMs calculated after OLS regression of the probability of being granted British citizenship where Brexit voting is interacted with the attributes,
with clustered standard errors and weights. Full and open squares show MM point estimates for Leavers and Remainers respectively; the horizontal lines
delineate 95 per cent confidence intervals. F-test of the null of hypothesis that all interaction terms are equal to zero: P < 0.05.
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All specifications yield results that are almost identical
to the ones obtained with the benchmark model. See
Supplementary Appendix Figures SA6 and SA8 for details.
Conclusion
Using original data and an innovative method, this study
provides unique insights into what it entails to become
British according to British nationals.
I find that a relatively high proportion of applicants
were regarded as meriting citizenship by respondents.
With the caveat that respondents were not explicitly asked
about how many citizenships they were willing to grant,
they allocated citizenship to an average of 73 per cent of
applications. Although I find that the groups I expected to
be more attached to their national identity and to be more
averse to immigration were more parsimonious in award-
ing citizenship, the rate of approval of applications
remained over 60 per cent across subgroups. This high
share of acceptance is in sharp contrast with British peo-
ple’s voiced desire to see immigration reduced (Blinder and
Richards, 2018). These findings suggest that respondents
were comfortable awarding citizenship, conditional on the
applicant’s attributes.
Crucially, I find a broad consensus over the criteria
respondents used to decide whether to grant citizen-
ship or not to applicants. Most interestingly, respond-
ents agreed on the importance of the applicant’s
occupation and irrelevance of country of origin to es-
tablish whether they were meriting of citizenship or
not. This suggests that when people do not need to
draw on the stereotypes and knowledge they hold
about immigrant groups, country of origin does not
shape preferences for the granting of citizenship. My
findings align with the historical-political character-
ization of British citizenship as both inclusive and ex-
clusionary: it is inclusive of minorities, but strictly
conditional. It is inclusive, provided that immigrants
are perceived to be economic contributors to society
and to ascribe to liberal values.
While I collected evidence about preferences, I can-
not measure their real-life repercussions. Citizenship is a
claim on the attention, solidarity, and responsibility of
fellow citizens and the state (Brubaker, 2004). The
largely shared exclusionary understanding of British citi-
zenship may have negative implications for those who
are excluded and for collective national cohesion. Of the
growing Muslim population in the United Kingdom (2.7
million in 2011), according to Ali (2015), 73 per cent
consider their only national identity to be British.
However, according to my experiment, these people
who think of themselves as British are considerably less
likely to be recognized as such by a large part of the ma-
jority population compared to non-Muslims. An em-
phasis on economic contribution could also lead to the
exclusion of specific immigrant-groups and minorities
that are more likely to cluster in low-paid occupations,
to be out of work, and/or to have caring responsibilities
(e.g. Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich, 2009). Native
citizens are less likely to recognize them as equals, which
could hamper their socio-economic and cultural integra-
tion and, in turn, the social cohesion in the country
(Bloemraad, 2018).
This study also did not investigate respondents’
understanding of citizenship in the context of naturaliza-
tion. Future research could shed further light on the na-
tive population’s awareness of what naturalization
grants to different groups of immigrants, and the value
and meaning it attaches to it.
The mechanisms identified in this study are likely
to apply to other country contexts. As a combination
of national identity and entitlement to claims and
rights, citizenship elicits preferences around who is
most similar to the majority and who brings the most
value. In western capitalist economies, this amounts
to Christian and productive immigrants. However, we
might expect those contexts which have a more recent
experience of immigration and/or who have not had a
multicultural approach to it to be overall less generous
in granting citizenship, but also potentially less select-
ive in these choices. Future research could valuably
test such possibilities and thereby extend our under-
standing of the meaning of citizenship and its poten-
tial for inclusion.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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